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Abstract 
Imagine a civilian communications system is being temporarily relied upon 
by an opposing military force for vital operations. If one launches a 
computer network attack against the communications system, the operation 
may disable the opposing force’s ability to function adequately and, as a 
result, prompt their surrender. The alternative course of action is to launch a 
traditional kinetic weapons attack in the hopes of inflicting enough 
casualties on the troops to induce surrender. Given these options, the law of 
war would encourage the utilization of the computer network attack because 
it would result in less unnecessary suffering. But is the same true if we are 
unsure of the collateral consequences of the computer network attack on a 
large civilian population that also relies on this communications system? 
For instance, because civilians use the same communications system to 
gather critical information, disabling the system might result in rioting, civil 
disorder, serious injuries, and deaths. Further, civilians may be unable to 
call for help, seek out medical assistance, or locate emergency response 
centers. Given these unknown yet potentially severe collateral consequences 
to civilians, it becomes less clear that a proportionality analysis under the 
law of war would favor the computer network attack over the traditional 
kinetic operation. In this article, Professor Lucian E. Dervan examines the 
application of the law of war to information operations and analyses the role 
of the Geneva Convention’s utilitarian goals in determining the validity of 
computer network attacks against dual-use civilian objectives. 
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A. Introduction 
Mobile telephones are vital military instrument for the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.1 The devices are used to detonate bombs, coordinate military 
movements, and communicate with leadership regarding future operations.2 
Despite their usefulness, mobile telephones also pose a significant risk to 
the Taliban.3 Over twelve million civilians in Afghanistan have mobile 
telephones and their use is not limited to communicating with family and 
friends or calling for medical or police assistance in times of need.4 For 
many Afghani civilians, mobile telephones serve as a weapon with which to 
provide information regarding the Taliban to coalition forces.5 Of course, 
because the civilians are often under the watchful eyes of Taliban forces 
during the day, most tips are provided at night, under the cover of darkness.6 
 
In 2008, in response to the growing nighttime flow of information 
between civilians and coalition forces, the Taliban ordered the mobile 
telephone industry to shut down some cell-towers from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 
a.m.7 According to the Taliban, this trial program to stop civilians from 
informing on Taliban movements was a success and, as a result, they 
 
1 Y. Trofimov, ‘Cell Barriers Bow to Taliban Threat’ (22 March 2010) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704117304575137541465235972.ht
ml (last visited 28 April 2011); (“The Taliban are using the cellphone system as an 
instrument of war against the Afghan government and the U.S.-led coalition.”). 
2 Id. (“‘Cellphones are a powerful tool for the Taliban: They offer a cheap and effective 
means to direct insurgent activities or pass intelligence…’ Militants all over the world 
use mobile phones to trigger explosions.”).  
3 Id. 
4 Id. (“Sardar Wali, a 19-year-old student from the Khwaja Mulk village north of 
Kandarhar city, said that, when his father became suddenly sick one night last year, 
the cellphone blackout prevented the family from calling a taxi to ferry the man to the 
hospital.”); M. Pueschel, ‘Cell Phones May Have Potential in Global Health Arena’, 
(26 August 2010) available at http://fhp.osd.mil/new.jsp?newsID=180 (last visited 
28 April 2011), discussing the “potential use of cell phones as innovative, cheap and 
efficient tools for public health”. 
5 Trofimov, supra note 1. 
6 Id. (“American troops, meanwhile, had painted phone tip-line signs on walls outside 
U.S. bases. Informers are usually reluctant to call in tips during daytime, when they 
can be spotted by Taliban sympathizers, military officers say.”). 
7 Id. 
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ordered a nationwide shutdown of all cell-towers during the night.8 At first, 
mobile telephone phone companies resisted these demands, unwilling to 
deprive their twelve million Afghan customers a vital service.9 In response, 
however, the Taliban destroyed over forty cell-towers, valued at sixteen 
million dollars.10 As might be expected, the mobile telephone providers then 
acquiesced.11 Today, millions of Afghans are thrust into isolation during the 
night as cell-tower after cell-tower goes dark.12 
While the Taliban gained control over a vital communications 
network using kinetic force, many militaries around the world have begun to 
utilize sophisticated information operations to achieve similar results 
without firing a single bullet and without the cooperation of civilian leaders 
or private business organizations. The term “information operations” refers 
to operations that involve the use of “electronic means to gain access to or 
change information in a targeted information system without necessarily 
damaging its physical components”13. Though there are various types of 
information operations, the most common is the use of computer network 
attacks to gain access to, disrupt and/or assert control over vital computer 
systems.14 As an example, rather than destroying mobile telephone towers in 
 
8 Id. (“[T]he Taliban noted that “the trial implementation of the decision has yielded 
positive results,” and decreed a sweeping national ban on night-time calls to ‘protect 
the Afghan people.’”). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. (“’We understand that in some areas, unfortunately, there is no other way,’ Mr. 
Sangin [Afghan Communications Minister] says, ‘We don’t have security to protect 
the towers.’”). 
12 Id. 
13 Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, ‘An Assessment of International 
Legal Issues in Information Operations’ (May 1999), 5 [Assessment of International 
Legal Issues]; ‘War in the Fifth Domain’, The Economist (1 July 2010) 25, 25-27. 
14 Id. (Assessment of International Legal Issues), 5 (“The proliferation of global 
electronic communications systems and the increased interoperability of computer 
equipment and operating systems have greatly improved the utility of all kinds of 
information systems. At the same time, these developments have made information 
systems that are connected to any kind of network, whether it be the Internet or some 
other radio or hard-wired communications system, vulnerable to computer network 
attacks.”); D. B. Hollis, ‘Why States need an International Law for Information 
Operations’, 11 Lewis & Clark Law Review (2007) 4, 1023, 1030 (“Much IO, 
however, centers on employing computers themselves in previously unavailable 
methods through the concept of ‘computer network operations.’”); According to the 
United States Department of Defense, information operations can be broken down into 
six component parts: Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare, Computer 
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Afghanistan, the Taliban could have hacked into the mobile telephone 
companies’ computer networks and seized control of the programs that 
regulate the cell-towers’ operations. Such an attack, which could have been 
executed from anywhere in the world, would have allowed the Taliban to 
dictate the times during which civilians could utilize their mobile telephones 
without using kinetic weapons to permanently destroy the cell-towers.15 
Information operations, therefore, are less expensive to execute than 
traditional military operations and allow for a more targeted and less 
destructive result.16 A real-world example of an information operation 
occurred during the 2008 Russian intervention in South Ossetia, a separatist 
region of the former Soviet Republic of Georgia.17 As traditional kinetic 
military operations were undertaken against Georgian targets, computer 
network attacks were simultaneously launched.18 These attacks defaced 
government websites and prevented communication between the Georgian 
President and the civilian population.19 The attack also disabled certain 
 
Network Operations, Military Deception, and Operational Security: W. E. Richter, 
‘The Future of information Operations’, Military Review (2009) 1, 103, 103-104. This 
article focuses on computer network attacks. 
15 Department of Defense, supra note 13, 5 (“[G]lobal communications are almost 
seamlessly interconnected and virtually instantaneous, as a result of which distance 
and geographical boundaries have become essentially irrelevant to the conduct of 
computer network attacks.”). 
16 J. Markoff, ‘Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks’ (12 August 2008) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html (last visited 28 April 
2011). (“‘It costs about 4 cents per machine […] You could fund an entire 
cyberwarfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank treat, so you would be foolish 
not to.’”). 
17 S. Watts, ‘Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack’, 50 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (2010) 2, 391, 397; M. Schwirtz, A. Barnard & C. J. Chivers, 
‘Russia and Georgia Clash over Separatist Region’ (8 August 2008) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html (last visited 
28 April 2011); M. Schwirtz, A. Barnard & A. E. Kramer, ‘Russian Forces Capture 
Military base in Georgia’ (11 August 2008) available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/08/12/world/europe/12georgia.html (last visited 28 April 2011). 
18 Id. (Watts), 397; Markoff, supra note 16, detailing the computer network attacks by 
Russia against Georgia during the conflict over South Ossetia. To date, the Russian 
government has denied involvement in the information warfare operations against 
Georgia and, as is the case with many such computer network attacks, there is little 
evidence to link the Russian government to the operations. 
19 Watts, supra note 17, 397. 
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government, news, transportation, and banking websites, creating disorder 
and panic amongst the civilian population.20 
 
Of course, information operations and computer network attacks 
extend well beyond communication networks and government websites. 
Such computer network attacks can cripple all manner of vital 
infrastructure, including electric power grids, water supply stations, food 
distribution networks, air traffic control systems, and emergency services 
apparatus, including evacuation notices and coordination of medical 
response teams.21 The importance of controlling computer networks through 
information operations has become so vital to modern warfare that nations 
around the world are currently engaging in limited computer network 
attacks in preparation for possible future armed conflicts.22 In 2009, U.S. 
 
20 Id. (“Later reports revealed that the CAN campaign had preceded the physical 
invasion by as much as twenty-four hours and that hackers may have launched 
computer network probing operations as early as July 20th.”); Markoff, supra note 16 
(“Weeks before bombs started falling on Georgia, a security researcher in suburban 
Massachusetts was watching an attack against the country in cyberspace.”). 
21 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructures as the “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.” USA Patriot Act of 2001 section 1016, text available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR: (last visited 28 April 
2011), 42 U.S.C., § 5195c. Included within this definition are the following: 
agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense 
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking 
and finance, chemical industry, and postal and shipping. S. M. Condron, ‘Getting it 
Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace’, 20 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology (2007) 2, 403, 406, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security: The President of the United States, ‘National Strategy for Homeland 
Security’ (16 July 2002) available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
nat_strat_hls.pdf (last visited 28 April 2011), 30. 
22 S. Gorman, ‘Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies’ (8 April 2009) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html (last visited 28 April 
2011). (“Cyberspies have penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software 
programs that could be used to disrupt the system, according to current and former 
national-security officials.”). Eric Jensen quotes a passage from a Chinese army 
publication entitled “Unrestricted Warfare.” 
 “[I]f attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the 
enemy nation being aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack 
against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a 
computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent’s computer 
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intelligence officials revealed that cyber operatives from China and Russia 
had infiltrated American electric power grid computer networks and planted 
malicious computer software programs to disrupt power supply in the event 
of a future military conflict.23 Along with targeting the U.S. power supply, 
these cyber operations targeted computer networks controlling water, sewer, 
and other vital infrastructure systems.24 As the world’s appreciation and 
contemplation of the importance of information operations grows, these 
undertakings are likely to continue to increase in sophistication and 
prominence. 
 
While information operations offer concrete advantages to militaries, 
they also pose two significant dangers to civilians. First, because militaries 
often utilize information systems and infrastructure resources that are 
primarily civilian in nature, a growth in information operations will result in 
increased targeting of civilian objectives. Second, various unpredictable 
collateral consequences can result to a civilian population from the 
infiltration and manipulation of vital computer networks. Given these 
dangers, this article will examine the lawfulness of computer network 
attacks under international law. In particular, this article will analyze 
whether traditional international legal principles regarding the law of war 
can adequately adapt to the utilitarian advantages of this new generation of 
warfare. 
 
system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack 
against the enemy so that the civilians electricity network, traffic dispatch 
network, financial transaction network, telephone communications 
network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will 
cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots and a political 
crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and 
military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to 
sign a dishonorable peace treaty.”, E. T. Jensen, ‘Computer Attacks on 
Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of 
Self-Defense’, 38 Stanford Journal of International Law (2002) 2, 207, 
207 [Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure]. 
23 Gorman, supra note 22. 
24 Id. In 2000, a computer network attack in Australia resulted in the release of 200,000 
gallons of sewage into parks, rivers, and the grounds of a hotel. 
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B. Computer Network Operations and International 
Law 
Imagine it is the year 2015, and the nation of Agnia has been closely 
monitoring a developing situation in the neighboring state of Centuria, with 
whom it has been engaged in cross-border skirmishes for five years. 
According to satellite imagery, ten-thousand troops from the Centurian 
military have begun massing on the outskirts of one of Centuria’s largest 
cities, Atlantis. Atlantis is located only one mile inside Centuria, has a 
population of one million, and contains many ethnic Agnians. According to 
intelligence reports, the mayor of Atlantis, an ethnic Agnian, has lead large 
anti-government protests during the past two weeks, which have included 
calls for the city and the surrounding region to become an independent 
country or be subsumed by Agnia. Leaders in Agnia fear that the Centurian 
military is preparing to attack the city and regain control of its population 
through force. Sympathetic to the desires of the citizens of Atlantis, the 
President of Agnia asks her military commanders to prepare a computer 
network attack directed against Centurian troops with the objective of 
preventing or limiting their intended military operations. 
 
The Agnian military commanders quickly return with a plan that 
recommends two separate operations to disrupt the Centurian military. 
 
(1) First, the Centurian military is relying on electric power for 
operation of much of its equipment. Therefore, the Agnian military 
commanders recommend use of a computer network attack to 
temporarily cut off power to the specific power grid being utilized by 
the Centurian military. While this directed attack will not result in 
power loss to the entire city of Atlantis, it will result in a loss of power 
for civilians who rely on the same power grid currently being utilized 
by the Centurian military. It is estimated this attack will negatively 
impact approximately twenty-thousand civilians. Further, the Agnia 
military commanders have warned the President that there is a 
possibility that the computer network attack will inadvertently cause a 
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(2) Second, the Agnian military commanders recommend 
targeting the Atlantis civilian communications infrastructure, which 
controls the dissemination of all satellite, internet, broadband, and 
mobile communication services in the region. This communications 
system is currently being utilized by the Centurian military for its own 
vital information gathering and communications purposes. According 
to the Agnian military commanders, a computer network attack will 
temporarily disable all civilian and military information gathering and 
communications in the region. The commanders are unsure what 
collateral consequences might result from depriving the civilians of 
Atlantis use of the communications system. 
 
Before these attacks are launched, a determination must be made 
regarding whether these non-kinetic operations are permitted under 
international law. Should these operations be deemed impermissible, the 
Agnian military commanders will recommend a traditional kinetic weapons 
attack against the Centurian military. The commanders believe that this 
attack will result in the deaths of at least one-thousand Centurian troops, but 
will result in few, if any, civilian casualties. 
I. The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to 
Information Operations 
While outside the scope of this article, the initial question for 
consideration in this hypothetical situation is whether the proposed 
computer network attacks are a “use of force” as described by the United 
Nations Charter. The United Nations Charter states that “[a]ll Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”25. If 
Agnia’s actions are considered a “use of force”, the computer network 
attacks may constitute a violation of the United Nations’ mandate against 
breaches of the peace.26 
 
Much debate has occurred in academia regarding whether computer 
network attacks constitute a “use of force.” Some scholars argue that 
 
25 Art. 2(4) Charter of the United Nations. 
26 See Arts 23-32 and 51 Charter of the United Nations. 
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information operations directed at critical national infrastructures are by 
definition “uses of force” that permit the aggrieved nation to respond with 
proportional self-defense pursuant to the United Nation’s Charter.27 Other 
scholars have argued that computer network attacks that result in damage 
that otherwise would require kinetic weaponry constitute a “use of force”28. 
Finally, some scholars contend that a determination regarding whether a 
computer network attack is a “use of force” depends on the particular 
circumstances of the operation and whether the results of the attack are 
sufficiently severe.29 
 
While the debate regarding whether computer network attacks are 
“uses of force” under the United Nations Charter is a fascinating topic and 
significant to the future regulation of information warfare, this article’s 
focus is on the ramifications of such operations to civilians under the 
framework of jus in bello. As such, the more important question for 
consideration is whether international humanitarian law applies to this 
 
27 Jensen, ‘Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure‘, supra note 22, 208-
209 (“[A]ttacks against a nation’s critical national infrastructure from any source 
constitutes a use of force. Such attacks, therefore, give the victim state the right to 
proportional self-defense – including anticipatory self-defense.”). 
28 D. Brown, ‘A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the use of 
Information Systems in Armed Conflict’, 47 Harvard International Law Journal 
(2006) 1, 179, 187-88. 
29 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Sue of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on A Normative Framework’, 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1999) 3, 885, 914-915. In his 1999 article Michael Schmitt argues for this later 
proposition and proposes six criteria for such an analysis – (a) the severity of the 
attack, (b) the immediacy of the negative consequences, (c) the directness of the 
negative consequences, (d) the invasiveness of the harm into the state, (e) the ease of 
measurability of the harm, and (f) the ability to recognize the action as presumptively 
impermissible unless falling within one of the two United Nations exceptions to use of 
force. Using these factors, Schmitt argues one can ascertain whether the 
characteristics of a particular computer network attack are similar to traditional forms 
of armed conflict or whether the acts are more appropriately outside this international 
wartime regulatory regime.; see also J. Barkham, ‘Information Warfare and 
International Law on the Use of Force’, 34 New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics (2001) 1, 57, 58 (“Applying these criteria determines 
whether the attack is ‘armed force’ or political or economic coercion […] Once the 
IW attack is deemed to be a use of force, the extent of the attack can be measured to 
determine whether there has been an armed attack, which would trigger Article 51.”). 
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situation.30 As the information operations proposed in this article are 
significant and would occur within the context of existing border 
skirmishes, we will assume that the parties are engaged in an “armed 
conflict” in which the law of war applies.31 
II. The Three Pillars of the Law of War 
Over many centuries the international community has established laws 
of war based on the guiding principle of jus in bello, which means justice in 
war.32 During the last century, these principles were codified into various 
international agreements, each of which serve to promote the ideal that 
civilians must be protected in times of war.33 This ideal is contained within 
the Geneva Convention through the adoption of the requirement that all 
military operations governed by the law of war satisfy three key criteria.34 
Military operations must be militarily necessary, a distinction must be made 
 
30 The “laws of armed conflicts” establish the bounds governing the manner in which 
hostilities are conducted. B. Van Schaack & R. C. Slye, International Criminal Law 
and Its Enforcement: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (2010), 214. 
31 The law of war only applies where there is an “armed conflict”, see Art. 2, Geneva 
Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 
12, 1949 (GC IV), 75 U.N.T.S. 287; E. T. Jensen, ‘Unexpected Consequences from 
Knock-Out Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?’ 18 
American University International Law Review (2002-2003) 5, 1145, 1150 
[Unexpected Consequences from Knock-Out Effects] (“Once two nations are in armed 
conflict with each other, the law of war applies.”). Information operations may be 
sufficient to constitute an armed conflict, see M. N. Schmitt, ‘The Principle of 
Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare’, 2 Yale Human Rights & Development Law 
Journal (1999), 144-145 [Computer Network Attacks] (“Humanitarian law does not 
apply in situations not amounting to armed conflict, such as riots, strikes, 
demonstrations, isolated acts of violence, or traditional criminal activity, even if 
military forces are employed to address them. In such cases, domestic and 
international human rights law tempers the violence.”); R. W. Aldrich, ‘How Do You 
Know You Are at War in the Information Age’, 22 Houston Journal of International 
Law (2000), 223, 232; Watts, supra note 17, 411-412 (“Despite lingering ambiguity 
concerning states’ CAN capabilities, a broad range of commentators accepts that 
CNAs between states could constitute armed conflict of sufficient scale and intensity 
to trigger the law of war generally and, specifically, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and their 1977 Protocols.”). 
32 Schmitt, ‘Discrimination’, supra note 29, 143, 145. 
33 Id., 144. (“The protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict is a 
core purpose of humanitarian law, a branch of international law also known as the law 
of armed conflict and the law of war.”). 
34 Discussed in detail infra section A.II.1 through A.II.3. 
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between military and civilian targets, and the attacks must be proportional.35 
Though the law of war has witnessed many advances in technology and 
weaponry, it has remained relevant because of its adaptability36, an 
adaptability that is vital when considering its application to the proposed 
information warfare operations by Agnia. 
1. Necessity 
While information operations may represent a new type of weaponry, 
the law of war still requires consideration of the principles of necessity, 
distinction, and proportionality. As described above, therefore, the first 
question Agnia must consider is whether a military necessity exists to strike 
the proposed targets.37 In this regard, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
requires that the attacks be directed at military targets with the objective of 
defeating the opponent military.38 
 
35 Art. 48, 51, 52(2), and 57 Protocol Additional to the General Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims or International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 12 December 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979); B. Van Schaack & 
R. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Cases and materials, 2nd 
ed. (2010), 266. 
36 Schmitt, ‘Discrimination’, supra note 29, 145-46 (“Because evolution in the conduct 
of warfare affects the individuals and objects which humanitarian law seeks to shelter, 
it is not surprising that law has proven responsive, both proactively and reactively, to 
warfare’s changing nature.”). 
 “In the aftermath of World War II, bipolarity and wars of national 
liberation dominated by inter-State conflict, while new technologies and 
sensibilities led to heightened concerns over the methods and means of 
warfare. The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, 
Environmental Modification Convention, Biological Weapons 
Convention, Conventional Weapons Convention, and Landmines 
Convention resulted. So too did numerous arms control treaties designed 
to limit the testing, possession, and spread of nuclear weapons, the 
unprecedented power of which had been so dramatically illustrated at 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima.”, Id. 
37 Department of Defense, supra note 13, 8 (“Targeting analysis must be conducted for 
computer network attacks just as it traditionally has been conducted for attacks using 
traditional weapons.). 
38 J. R. Heaton, ‘Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying 
the Armed Forces’, 57 Air Force Law Review (2005), 155, 180-81 (“The purpose of 
this principle is to ensure that every military action is driven by a military requirement 
and is intended to subjugate the enemy in the shortest amount of time and at the least 
possible expense of men and materiel. Under this principle, acts which lack any direct 
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“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far 
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”39 
 
Pursuant to this paragraph, a selected target is valid if (a) it makes an 
effective contribution to the military action and (b) its destruction will offer 
a definite military advantage.40 Where the selected target is part of the 
opponent’s military infrastructure, such as weapons depositories or military 
communications centers, attacking the target will almost always satisfy the 
requirement of necessity.41 The analysis of the proposed attacks by Agnia is 
complicated by the fact that each operation focuses not on purely military 
targets, but on dual-use civilian facilities and networks.42  
 
military purpose, such as indiscriminate bombing of civilian dwellings or food 
supplies, are prohibited.”). 
39 Art. 52(2) Protocol Additional to the General Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protections of Victims or International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
12 December 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979) [Protocol I] (emphasis added); Article 
51(4) Protocol I also contains relevant restrictions regarding the targeting of military 
objectives rather than civilian objectives: 
 “Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects 
of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; 
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.” 
40 Id.; D. E. Graham, ‘Cyber Threats and the Law of War’, 4 Journal of National 
Security Law & Policy (2010), 87, 98 (“‘Military necessity’ authorizes the use of force 
required to accomplish the mission. It does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by 
the [laws of war].”). 
41 Department of Defense, supra note 13, 8 (“During an armed conflict virtually all 
military infrastructures will be lawful targets, but purely civilian infrastructures must 
not be attacked unless the attacking force can demonstrate that a definite military 
advantage is expected from the attack.”). 
42 Where it is unclear whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes 
is being utilized for a military purpose, the Geneva Convention requires the party 
presume the target is not making an effective military contribution. Protocol I, supra 
note 39, Art. 52(3). In the hypothetical examined herein, however, it is clear that the 
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“Dual-use” targets are ones that “simultaneously serve both civilian 
and military objectives,” including facilities and networks that are primarily 
for civilian utilization but which are being temporarily used by the 
military.43 The Atlantis power station and civilian communications system 
are both dual-use targets because, while they primarily serve the civilian 
population, they are currently also being utilized by the Centurian military. 
While dual-use objectives complicate a necessity analysis, they do not enjoy 
absolute protection from attack. Rather, the two prong analysis for necessity 
remains applicable in determining whether these are permissible targets.  
 
First, do the Atlantis dual-use targets make an effective contribution to 
the Centurian military? This determination is influenced by consideration of 
the targets’ nature, location, purpose, and use.44 Each dual-use target 
provides a vital resource to the region and is within the area in which the 
Centurian military is massing. Further, though originally intended to solely 
support the needs of the civilian population of Atlantis, these facilities and 
networks are currently being utilized by the Centurian military for 
significant information gathering, communications, and support functions. 
Finally, just as electric power and communications capabilities are vital to 
the effective subsistence of the civilian population, they are vital to the 
continued and successful completion of Centuria’s military endeavors. As 
such, these targets do make an effective and, in fact, significant contribution 
to the military actions of the opposing force. Second, will disabling these 
facilities and networks offer a definite military advantage? As described 
above, these facilities and networks are vital to the Centurian military 
operation. As such, a strong argument exists that targeting these objectives 
will offer a significant and definite military advantage to Agnia. Based on 
this analysis, it appears that these proposed targets, though dual-use, satisfy 
the requirement of military necessity. 
 
power station and civilian communications systems are both being utilized for military 
purposes. 
43 Jensen, ‘Unexpected Consequences from Knock-Out Effects’, supra note 31, 1157; J. 
M. Meyer, ‘Tearing Down the Façade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on 
Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine’, 51 Air Force Law Review 
(2001) 143, 178 (discussing dual-use objectives). 
44 Protocol I, supra note 39, Art. 52(2). 
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2. Distinction 
A concept related to necessity under the law of war is the requirement 
that military operations utilize weaponry that can distinguish between 
civilian and military targets and that when attacks are carried out an effort is 
made to distinguish between civilian and military objectives. 
 
“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives.”45 
 
Just as occurred with the necessity analysis, the presence of dual-use 
targets complicates satisfaction of the distinction requirement. 
 
With regard to the power station attack, the use of an information 
operation permits the specific targeting of only that power grid being 
utilized by the Centurian military. As a result, the operation is designed to 
utilize available weaponry that distinguishes between power grids serving 
only civilian customers and those being utilized by the Centurian military. 
Had Agnia decided to target the entire power station, despite its ability to 
more precisely target only the power grid that was properly classified as a 
military target, such an act would constitute a violation of the tenet of 
distinction.46 In this scenario, therefore, the availability of an information 
 
45 Protocol I, supra note 39, Art. 48; see also Protocol I, supra note 39, Art. 51(4): 
 “Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means 
of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objectives without distinction.” 
46 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Wire Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello’, 84 
International Review of the Red Cross (2002), 365, 390 [Wired Warfare] (analogizing 
the failure to specifically direct an information operation when possible to the use of 
SCUD missiles by Iraq in the first Gulf War: 
 “The SCUD is not an inherently indiscriminate weapon. Indeed, it is 
easily capable of being aimed with sufficient accuracy against, for 
instance, military formations in the desert. However, the use of SCUDS 
against population centres was indiscriminate even if the Iraqi intent was 
to strike military objectives situated therein; the likelihood of striking 
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operation actually assists the civilian population by limiting this attack to 
military objectives. 
 
The analysis is more complex when one considers the proposed 
operation against the civilian communications network. Currently, it is 
estimated that 98 percent of all classified governmental communications and 
95 percent of all military communications in the United States flow through 
civilian communication systems, not dedicated military networks.47 As a 
result, the composition of modern information systems makes it much more 
likely that civilian assets will be targeted during times of war. This is 
particularly true because, unlike the power station example above, the 
interconnected nature of civilian communications systems makes it almost 
impossible to isolate military communications for attack. As a result, 
operations directed against civilian communications systems must disrupt or 
disable the entire network, shutting down not only military operations but 
also all civilian information gathering and communication functions. Given 
these operational realities, Agnia’s proposed computer network attack is 
troubling because of its potential significant impact on civilians who are 
likely highly dependent on this communications system for important 
information, particularly during times of unrest and conflict. Further, these 
concerns regarding potential civilian collateral consequences are more acute 
when one considers that the utilization of the Atlantis communications 
system by the Centurian military is likely limited when compared with the 
total usage by the civilian population. Though these are significant concerns 
which will be addressed again during the proportionality analysis under the 
law or war, these issues do not prevent this operation proceeding under the 
tent of distinction. Rather, if the Atlantis civilian communications system is 
properly considered a target of military necessity and there is no existing 
information warfare mechanism by which to disrupt only the military 
communications, this proposed attack is permissible.48 
 
protected persons and objects so outweighed that of hitting legitimate 
targets that the use was inadmissible.”). 
47 E. T. Jensen, ‘Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks’, 88 
Texas Law Review (2010) 7, 1533, 1534 [Cyber Warfare]; Jensen, ‘Computer Attacks 
on Critical National Infrastructure’, supra note 22, 211. 
48 Others considering this issue have reached similar conclusions: Schmitt, ‘Wire 
Warfare’, supra note 48, 384 (“[I]f an object is being used for military purposes, it is a 
military objective vulnerable to attack, including computer network attack. This is true 
even if the military purposes are secondary to the civilian ones.”). 
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3. Proportionality and Unnecessary Suffering 
The final prong of analysis to determine the legitimacy of the 
proposed computer network attacks is proportionality, an analysis that will 
highlight the uniqueness of information operations and the need for 
flexibility in determining the permissibility of such military operations. 
Proportionality conveys the centuries old notion that during war “the right 
of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited… It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering.”49 This limitation on the methods and means of warfare is 
intended to protect both combatants and civilians. As such, along with the 
above general prohibition, the Geneva Convention contains a specific 
requirement that consideration be given to the impact of proposed 
operations on civilians. 
 
“[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes 
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special 
protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”50 
 
Pursuant to the above sections of the Geneva Convention, even where 
a target is of military necessity and, to the extent possible, a distinction has 
been made between the military and civilian components of the target, the 
proposed operation may still violate the law of war if it would result or may 
be expected to result in unnecessary suffering by either combatants or 
 
49 Art. 35(1)-(2) Protocol I, supra note 40; see also Article 22 Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html (last visited 28 April 2011) 
[Hague Convention IV], (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited.”); and Art. 23(e) (prohibiting the use of “arms, projectiles, or 
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”). 
50 Art. 57(2)(b) Protocol I, supra note 40; see also Art. 51(5) Protocol I, supra 37: 
 “Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: 
(…)(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 
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civilians. At its core, therefore, the proportionality analysis is an 
examination of the utilitarian ramifications of an operation. Importantly, it is 
this core utilitarian aspect of the law of war that allows it the flexibility to 
adapt to new and evolving weaponry, including information warfare. 
 
With regard to the directed attack on the power grid providing energy 
to the Centurian military, satisfying the proportionality requirement is 
assisted, in part, by the advent of information operations. First, rather than 
disabling the power supply to the entire city of Atlantis, a computer network 
attack in this situation allows for directed targeting of only the power grid 
within which the Centurian military is operating. This significantly limits 
the attack’s impact on the civilian population and, although civilians living 
within the same power grid will be impacted, a strong argument exists that 
these collateral consequences do not amount to unnecessary suffering, 
particularly given the significant military advantage to be gained through 
the attack. Second, an information operation is distinct from a traditional 
kinetic attack because it does not destroy the asset being targeted. As a 
result, once the military advantage is secured or the reason for the operation 
dissipates, power to the grid can be restored. With traditional kinetic 
weaponry, such quick remediation is impossible. As an example, kinetic 
attacks against Iraqi power stations during the first Gulf War lead to decades 
of power supply problems for the civilian population.51 By comparison, the 
proposed attack by Agnia is both specifically directed at a limited portion of 
the total power supply and can be reversed once the military necessity of the 
operation has passed. 
 
While the above proposed directed attack on the Atlantis power 
station appears to satisfy the proportionality requirements of the law of war, 
there remains a hidden danger in undertaking this operation that must be 
considered.52 As admitted by the Agnian military commanders, though 
 
51 Department of Defense, ‘Assessment of International Legal Issues’, supra note 14, 8-9 
(discussing the bombing of Iraq’s power grids during the first Gulf War); see also 
Associated Press, ‘Iraq suffers hot summer amid power problems’ (7 September 2009) 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32726457/ (last visited 28 April 2011): 
“During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. warplanes targeted the power grid. It was further 
damaged in the 2003 invasion, the looting that followed and finally by insurgent 
attacks designed to cripple the country”. 
52 Schmitt, ‘Discrimination’, supra note 32, 168. (“If first-tier collateral damage and 
incidental injury (i.e., damage and injury directly caused by the kinetic force of the 
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information operations offer the ability to more precisely target certain 
objectives, interfering with computer networks can result in significant 
unintended consequences. In some situations, an information operation 
might be directed at a single network believed to control a precise system, 
but which might unexpectedly also control other vital portions of the 
civilian infrastructure. Further, where a virus or other malicious program is 
utilized to disable a specific computer network, it is possible that the virus 
might spread to other unintended computer systems.53 Such secondary 
effects are called “knock-out effects”54. As an example, consider again the 
proposed computer network attack on the Atlantis power station’s computer 
network. The intended goal of the operation is to disable only the power 
grid that supplies the region being occupied by the Centurian military. It is 
possible, however, that while launching this attack an error in the computer 
program might shut down the entire power station and deprive the whole 
city of Atlantis of energy. This lack of power might in turn result in the 
city’s water treatment plant and other vital pieces of infrastructure becoming 
inoperable. Further, unknown to the Agnian military, the same computer 
network that controls the power station might also control other vital 
portions of the infrastructure, including portions of the infrastructure vital to 
the survival of the civilian population.55 For these reasons, “knock-out 
 
attack) become rarer, it is probable that humanitarian attention will increasingly dwell 
on subsequent-tier, or reverberating, effects.”). 
53 Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare’, supra note 48, 389. 
 “In many cases, once a vital code is launched against a target computer or 
network, the attacker will have no way to limit its subsequent 
retransmission. This may be true even in a closed network, for the virus 
could, for instance, be transferred into it by diskette. Simply put, a 
malicious code likely to be uncontrollably spread throughout civilian 
systems is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon.” 
54 Id., 392-93 (“The most cited example is that of the attack on the Iraqi electrical grid 
during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Although it successfully disrupted Iraqi command and 
control, the attack also denied electricity to the civilian population (a ‘first-tier’ 
effect), thereby affecting hospitals, refrigeration, emergency response, etc.”) Both the 
terms "knock-on effects" and "knock-out effects" are used to describe these secondary 
collateral impacts. 
55 Art. 54(2) Protocol I, supra note 37, specifically prohibits attacks directed at 
infrastructure that is vital the survival of civilians: 
 “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies 
and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance 
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether 
in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.” 
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effects” can be devastating to the civilian population. How, therefore, 
should the possibility of such unexpected and unpredictable collateral 
consequences flowing from information operations be addressed by the law 
of war? Should these potential ramifications to the civilian population result 
in our rejecting this information operation in favor of the assured, yet 
limited destructive results of the alternative kinetic attack against the 
Centurian forces? 
 
While the possible collateral impact on civilians from “knock-out 
effects” are significant, information operations offer discernable concrete 
benefits and allow for the remedying of unforeseen consequences. These 
advantages to this modern form of warfare strongly support the favoring of 
information operations over traditional kinetic attacks on utilitarian grounds. 
First, and perhaps most significant, along with being less expensive, 
computer network attacks are bloodless as compared to traditional kinetic 
weaponry.56 As a result, instead of causing significant long term damage 
and inflicting large numbers of casualties, a computer network attack 
advances the Geneva Convention’s goal of minimizing suffering.57 Second, 
computer network attacks offer a distinct advantage not previously available 
in war because they can be reversed. As an example, should the proposed 
information operation against the power station result in a larger impact on 
the civilian population than predicted, the operation may be remediated by 
launching a second computer infiltration to place the power station back 
online.58 Importantly, countries that rely on information operations should 
 
56 Jensen, ‘Unexpected Consequences from Knock-Out Effects, supra note 32, 1161 
(“Given the bloodless nature of CAN and its ability to affect armed conflict, it can and 
should be a readily available weapon in the commander’s arsenal.”); J. T. G. Kelsey, 
‘Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and 
Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare.’, 106 Michigan Law Review 2008) 7, 1427, 
1445 (“[W]ar via the Internet is potentially cheaper than waging a conventional 
campaign.”). 
57 Id.(Kelsey), 1447 (arguing that the law of war should permit information operation 
that might otherwise be considered unlawful where they have the advantage of 
“dealing blows to an enemy with a low cost in human life and possibly little physical 
damage to civilian objects.”); R. G. Hanseman, ‘The Realities and Legalities of 
Information Warfare’, 42 Air Force Law Review (1997), 173, 198 (“to an extent the 
new technology holds the promise of enabling destructive acts that are not really 
“violent.” Such weapons will be less dependent on big explosions. Few explosions 
means less property destroyed and fewer unplanned human casualties.”). 
58 This article does not purport to argue that reversing information operations is easy or 
reliable. Nevertheless, in considering the utilitarian advantages of information 
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be required to prepare such remedial operations in advance and in 
anticipation of the possibility of knock-out effects.59 Such remediation 
would not be possible with traditional kinetic weaponry, which would inflict 
irreversible devastation once unleashed. As a result, though the proposed 
computer network attack holds the possibility of causing significant 
unintended collateral damage, because of the concrete humanitarian benefits 
of such operations and the likelihood of remediating any unintended 
consequences before they result in disproportionate suffering, engaging in 
this operation, despite the dangers, appears consistent with the goals of the 
law of war.60 
 
operations as compared to kinetic weaponry, the ability to reverse an attack should be 
considered. Further, if militaries rely on utilitarian arguments in proposing computer 
network attacks, they should be obligated to prepare strategies for responding to any 
unforeseen consequences in advance of initiating the operation to minimize any delay 
in remediating unexpected collateral consequences. See J. P. Terry, ‘The Lawfulness 
of Attacking Computer Networks in Armed Conflicts and in Self-Defense in Periods 
Short of Armed Conflict: What are the Targeting Constraints?’ 169 Military Law 
Review (2001), 70, 86-87. 
59 Id., 86-87. 
 “[A]ny weapon developed to provide [computer network attack] 
capability must be both predictable and capable of being armed and 
disarmed; otherwise they will unduly threaten innocent civilians in the 
target state and the user state. Downs is correct when he suggests that 
weaponeers should, in general, co-develop a detection and immunization 
program for all viruses they intend to use. In this way, a [digital data 
warfare] attack gone wrong cannot inadvertently do harm to the attacker.” 
60 An argument also exists that where the collateral consequences are speculative they do 
not violate the proportionality doctrine because they were not “expected” to occur. 
See Protocol I, supra note 37, Art. 57(2). 
 “With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military 
objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited 
by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a 
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.” 
 see also E. T. Jensen, ‘Unexpected Consequences from Knock-Out Effects’, supra 
note 32, 1179-81 (arguing that only those consequences that are expected to occur are 
considered indiscriminate and, therefore, computer network attacks that lead to 
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In examining the proposed attack on the Atlantis civilian 
communications system, the same types of considerations regarding 
utilitarianism must be made to determine the operation’s legitimacy. As 
discussed above, civilian communication systems are interconnected in such 
a manner as to make it nearly impossible to isolate specific military 
communications from general civilian utilization of the networks. As a 
result, the entire system must be targeted and disabled. Just as the collateral 
consequences of the attack on the power station are unclear, so too are the 
ramifications from disabling a city’s communications network. Here, 
however, the analysis is slightly different. Unlike the power station 
example, it is clear that this operation will impact the entire city of Atlantis. 
What remains uncertain, however, is whether the resulting detriment to 
civilians will be severe enough to warrant abandoning this information 
operation in favor of a traditional kinetic attack on Centurian forces. It is 
possible the proposed attack will result in the civilian population being 
inconvenienced, but not subjected to unnecessary suffering or deprived of 
necessities vital to its existence.61 It is also possible, however, that the attack 
may result in severe consequences for the civilian population. For instance, 
the city may experience riots or other civil unrest due to a breakdown in 
emergency response systems. This alone might result in significant civilian 
casualties. Further, civilians may have difficulty gathering information 
regarding food and water distribution centers, where to receive medical 
treatment or other assistance, or where to take shelter or evacuate the city 
should armed conflict ensue. Given the possible direct and significant 
impact on civilians resulting from a disruption of the Atlantis civilian 
communications system and the limited use of the system by the military, 
does this proposed attack satisfy the requirement of proportionality? 
 
Once again, if one focuses on the utilitarian goals of the Geneva 
Convention, it appears that the ascertainable benefits of information 
operations and the remedial abilities of computer network attacks outweigh 
 
unexpected collateral consequences do not violate the law of war). Where the possible 
impact on a civilian population from a knock-out effect is contemplated, however, 
particularly based on past experience, and the consequences are sever, reliance on this 
doctrine alone may be insufficient. 
61 Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare’, supra note 48, 397 (“For instance, turning off the 
electricity to a city to disrupt enemy command, control and communications may be 
acceptable if doing so does not cause excessive civilian suffering.”). 
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the speculative dangers of these undertakings to civilians.62 First, as 
discussed above, while the possible collateral consequences to the civilian 
population are uncertain, it is clear that choosing to launch an information 
operation rather than engage in traditional kinetic attacks offers significant 
benefits. Information operations are more cost effective and can result in 
less loss of life. Further, they do not require the destruction of the objective. 
Rather, information operations can seek only to disable a target for a 
specific period of time, a fundamental advantage as dual-use civilian targets 
grow in prominence. Second, because computer network attacks are often 
reversible, if the speculative dangers of the operation come to pass the 
attack can be reversed. In this example, should the lack of a 
communications system result in significant negative consequence for the 
civilian population of Atlantis, the Agnian military could execute an 
operation to restore the system to full functionality. Again, this would 
require certain anticipatory planning on the part of the Agnian military, thus 
allowing them to respond quickly should such events transpire. Requiring 
such anticipatory planning seems a small cost, however, in return for the 
significant benefits to both civilians and military personnel from favoring 
information operations over traditional kinetic attacks.63 
C. Conclusion 
The law of war has evolved as battlefields and weapons have changed. 
Today, warfare has drifted into the ether and is taking place within computer 
networks and information systems. As a result, the law of war must adapt as 
it has in the past to take advantage of the benefits of this new type of 
 
62 Hollis, supra note 15, 1055: “Perhaps states should allow [Information Operations] a 
wider, albeit virtual, impact on civilian populations if the result is less physical harm 
overall, or even on an individual basis, than traditional warfare.” 
63 It is important to note that this article is advancing the theory that unintended and 
unexpected collateral consequences should not prohibit the utilization of modern 
weaponry that holds the potential to significantly reduce the amount of death and 
suffering during war. This does not mean, however, that where the collateral 
consequences of a proposed computer network attack are probable that the analysis is 
the same. In such situations, the risks associated with a computer network attack, 
particularly where assurance could not be provided regarding the reversibility of the 
mission, may lead to a determination that the operation does not satisfy the 
proportionality requirements of the law of war. As with all proposed military 
operations, the application of the law of war must be conducted in a case by case 
manner applying all ascertainable facts. 
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weaponry, including the unique ability to remediate unexpected 
consequences. Though war will never be without tragedy or loss, if 
information warfare holds the possibility that war might be more humane 
for civilians and militaries alike the law of war should seize these 
advantages and not reject these utilitarian advancements for fear of the 
unknown. 
 
